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ARGUMENT 
MRS. ATHERLEY'S CLAIM MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CANFIELD 
THEORY OF LIABILITY. 
As Mrs. Atherley set forth in her brief, evidence was 
presented to the trial court sufficient to state a claim under the 
theory of liability set forth in Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841 
P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Mrs. Atherley showed that she had stepped and slipped on a 
strawberry that was approximately six feet away from the table 
holding Albertson's strawberry display. (R at 92.) She produced 
testimony that there were no barriers around the strawberry display 
to prevent strawberries from rolling to the floor, that there were 
no floor mats around the strawberry display, and that the 
strawberries were displayed in open containers. (R at 92 through 
93.) Canfield does not require that Mrs. Atherley demonstrate that 
Albertson's method of displaying strawberries was "uniquely 
dangerous." The fact that Albertson's may have displayed other 
produce in a dangerous or hazardous manner does not render their 
display of strawberries acceptable. 
A. Mrs. Atherley Produced Evidence Sufficient For The Fact 
Finder To Conclude That Albertson's Had Chosen A Method Of Display 
That Was Dangerous When Combined With The Foreseeable Patterns Of 
Customer Conduct Or When Simply Acted Upon By The Law Of Gravity. 
Mrs. Atherley had no obligation to show that the strawberry 
display was in any way unique. The strawberry display was no more 
unique than the farmer's pack display of lettuce in Canfield. 
Selling lettuce in farmer's packs was certainly not unique to 
Albertson's. It was different and more dangerous, however, than 
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the alternate method of display that Albertson's also used, that is 
selling lettuce wrapped in cellophane. The identical situation was 
presented with Albertson's elected methods of displaying 
strawberries. It sold strawberries in closed containers but also 
sold strawberries in open containers, displayed on inclined tables 
with no barriers sufficient to catch the strawberries in the event 
they were acted upon by the force of gravity or bumped by 
customers. 
Albertson's would place a burden on Mrs. Atherley to provide 
"expert" testimony that Albertson's method of display was 
dangerous. That is not a conclusion requiring expert testimony but 
is, instead, a fact so within the common knowledge and experience 
of the lay person that a jury, the only proper fact finder in this 
case, could determine that the method of display was dangerous. 
Mrs. Atherley also has no burden to show that Albertson's method of 
display differed from display practices in other stores. The fact 
that every other store may also use dangerous methods of display 
does not render those methods less dangerous. The Canfield opinion 
does not require expert testimony to establish the dangerous 
condition. The standard of care in this type of case is not 
established by an industry standard. 
The evidence presented by Mrs. Atherley went well beyond her 
"allegations of the store owner's negligence." She provided clear 
evidence, through the testimony of Albertson's own witness, that it 
was foreseeable to Albertson's that strawberries would end up on 
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the floor either through a pattern of customer conduct or by merely 
rolling or being bumped to the floor. (R at 66.) 
Albertson's was just as aware of the hazards posed by the 
strawberries as it was the hazards created by the farmer's pack 
lettuce display in Canfield. Albertson's points out that in the 
Canfield case, it placed disposal boxes around the farmer's pack 
display, a measure it did not take with other produce displays. 
Albertson's produced testimony that it tried to remedy the hazard 
posed by the open strawberry displays by placing barriers around 
the incline displays and mats on the floors next to the display 
cases. These actions would have absolutely no purpose if 
Albertson's was not aware of the potential hazard created by its 
method of display. Mrs. Atherley disputed that there were barriers 
sufficient to keep strawberries from rolling or being bumped off of 
the display onto the floor and disputed the claim that their were 
mats directly next to the display case. The fact that Albertson's 
has provided evidence that it took these measures to try to remedy 
a dangerous method of display, establishes that it was aware of the 
risks created by that method of display. The Canfield analysis is 
directly on point and the facts of Mrs. Atherley's fall are almost 
identical to those of the plaintiff in Canfield. 
B. The Canfield Theory Of Liability Applies In 
Mrs. Atherley's Case And Does Not Impose Strict Liability On Store 
Owners. Albertson's Interpretation Of The Canfield Requirements 
Seeks Absolute Immunity For Store Owners Against The Claims Of 
Customers Who Could Not Possibly Meet The Burden That Albertson's 
Interpretation Would Impose. 
It is an insupportable stretch of reason for Albertson's to 
argue that applying the Canfield theory to Mrs. Atherley's claim 
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would impose absolute liability on store owners. Canfield does not 
impose absolute liability on store owners. Mrs. Atherley's claim 
has met the Canf ield requirements and, therefore, does not seek the 
imposition of absolute liability. If Mrs. Atherley's claim is 
allowed to go back to the trial court, she will still have to 
present her case to the jury and persuade the jury that Albertson's 
method of display was dangerous. 
In fact, if the court were to apply Albertson's interpretation 
of the Canfield theory, store owners would be afforded virtually 
absolute immunity from the claims of customers who could not 
possibly meet that burden because of the impossibility of gaining 
the type of knowledge that Albertson's would require them to obtain 
and to present as evidence before they could even present their 
cause to the jury. 
C. Albertson's "Proximate Cause" Argument Is A Red Herring. 
Proximate Cause Is Established To The Same Degree As It Was In 
Canfield. 
In its "proximate cause" argument Albertson's again attempts 
to impose the burdens of the first theory of liability on those 
seeking redress under the Canfield theory. Albertson's would have 
this court uphold the trial court's Summary Judgment determination 
because Mrs. Atherley cannot show precisely how the strawberry that 
she fell on came to be on the floor. In all likelihood, 
Mrs. Atherley may never be able to establish that fact. Under the 
Canf ield theory, however, it is not necessary for her to do so. It 
is precisely that type of unreasonable burden that the Canfield 
theory rejects. Even proximate cause is a question of fact to be 
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determined by the fact finder. Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 
(Utah App. 1993) . The jury can determine proximate cause from the 
facts that Mrs. Atherley will be able to present and could make a 
determination from the facts that she has already presented. The 
kind of wild speculation suggested by Albertson's would not be 
necessary for a jury to reach such a conclusion. We know that 
Albertson's brought the strawberries into the store, chose to 
display them openly, and knew of the hazard presented by that open 
display. There was no more evidence in Canfield that the lettuce 
leaf came directly from the farmer's pack display of lettuce than 
there is that the strawberry came directly from the open display of 
strawberries. Albertson's speculation that the strawberry may have 
come out of a closed container of strawberries is no different than 
alleging that the lettuce leaf came from a head of lettuce that may 
have been loosely wrapped in cellophane, or opened by a customer 
and discarded where the plaintiff in Canfield fell, or even, as 
Albertson's suggests, brought into the store from the outside by a 
customer. The facts presented by Mrs. Atherley do not present any 
greater challenge to the jury than did the facts in Canfield. 
D. The Trial Court Improperly Applied The Traditional Theory 
Of Liability Which It Never Saw As Separate From The Canfield 
Theory. 
It was apparent throughout this proceeding that both the trial 
court and Albertson's were very uncomfortable with the Canfield 
theory of liability and its fair application. The trial court and 
Albertson's are apparently more comfortable applying the 
traditional theory of liability which acts as a bar to most 
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plaintiffs. The Canfield theory, as Mrs. Atherley has amply shown, 
applies to her case which is virtually identical factually to the 
Canfield case. Mrs. Atherley's claim cannot survive under the 
traditional theory, but in light of Canfield, it does not have to. 
CONCLUSION 
Canfield is directly on point with Mrs. Atherley's claim which 
meets all of the standards set by Canf ield. Mrs. Atherley 
presented facts to the trial court sufficient to defeat Summary 
Judgment. She presented facts sufficient for a jury to make a 
determination that Albertson's is liable for Mrs. Atherley's 
injuries under the Canfield theory. It is also critical to keep in 
mind that it should not have been necessary for Mrs. Atherley to 
present her entire case in order to defeat Summary Judgment. 
Additional facts can certainly be developed before trial. The 
facts presented by Mrs. Atherley to the trial court, however, were 
sufficient to defeat Albertson's Summary Judgment motion. She was, 
however,, granted no deference by the trial court. Albertson's is 
arguing for absolute immunity for store owners by asking this court 
to render an interpretation of Canfield that would deny plaintiffs 
the very remedy that this court determined plaintiffs were entitled 
to have in store owner liability cases where they were under such 
an enormous disadvantage under the traditional theory of liability. 
The trial court improperly granted Albertson's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. This court should reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand Mrs. Atherley's claim to be tried under the 
Canfield theory. 
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